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COLLATERAL POST CONVICTION REMEDIES
IN FLORIDA
GENE

D.

BROWN*

March 18, 1963, was a significant date in the development of criminal
due process. On that date the United States Supreme Court delivered a set
of judicial quintuplets that piloted a new era in the application of constitutional guarantees of individual rights.' All of these decisions were important,
but the case of Gideon v. Wainwright2 was destined to overshadow the
others. Clarence Earl Gideon had been convicted in Bay County, Florida, of
breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor. Gideon's request for appointed counsel was refused and he was sentenced to five years
in the state penitentiary at Raiford. The Florida Supreme Court denied
Gideon's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, relying on controlling precedent
from the United States Supreme Court. 3 But when the United States Supreme
Court accepted Gideon's pro se petition for a writ of certiorari and set the
case for argument,4 thoughtful leaders of the Florida bench and bar quickly
realized that this "precedent" was condemned to early interment.
The Florida Attorney General's Office took immediate steps to marshal
assistance from other states, realizing that Abe Fortas would present a strong
case as Gideon's appointed counsel. This call for help backfired, however,
when twenty-two states refused to aid Florida and joined instead in an
amicus curiae brief filed in Gideon's behalf. Only Alabama and South
Carolina submitted briefs supporting Florida's position.
The Florida Supreme Court and the Florida Judicial Council began
preparation for the Gideon decision well before it was actually handed down.
At a meeting of the council in the Supreme Court Building on September 15,
1962, several members of the court emphasized the potential impact on
Florida should the Gideon case be overruled. In this event, over half of
Florida's prisoners would then have an immediate right to apply for post5
conviction relief.
The only post-conviction remedies available, however, were habeas corpus
and coram nobis, both of which were circumscribed by procedural restrictions.
Venue in habeas corpus could be laid only in the jurisdiction of incarceration.
Thus, thousands of prisoners in Raiford could be expected to seek relief in
the Florida Supreme Court, the First District Court of Appeal, and the
Circuit Court of the Eighth Circuit. This would have constituted an almost
OB.S. 1963, Florida State University; J.D. 1966, University of Florida; Member Tallahassee, Florida, Bar, The Florida Bar, and The American Bar Association.
I. Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
4. Gideon v. Cochran, 370 U.S. 908 (1962).
5. As of June, 1962, 4,065 of the 8,000 prisoners then in custody in Florida had pleaded
guilty without the assistance of counsel, and 477 others had pleaded not guilty without
counsel. Figures taken from files of Florida State Division of Corrections.
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unbearable judicial responsibility, to the detriment of other litigants in those
three courts. It would have required the supreme court and the First District
Court of Appeal to appoint a commissioner in each case requiring factual
determinations, and the circuit judges of the Eighth Circuit would have been
overburdened with habeas corpus hearings. Coram nobis was even more
cumbersome, being hamstrung by numerous restrictions, including a trial by
jury0
Those present at the meeting of September 15, 1962, understood the
urgency of the situation. On October 27, 1962, the judicial council strongly
recommended to the supreme court the early adoption of an expeditious procedure for handling post-conviction claims.7 In addition, the council began
preparing legislation to establish a statewide public defender system for submission to the 1963 legislature. At that time only three circuits had public
defenders.
There were at least two alternatives for an effective post-conviction procedure. The court could wait for the legislature to enact a statutory remedy,
or, as the council had recommended, it could adopt a court rule under the
authority of article V, section III, of the Florida Constitution. The court
chose the latter approach for two basic reasons. First, a court rule would
provide the needed flexibility; it could be revised at any time by court order,
while a statutory procedure could be changed only at one of the biennial
legislative sessions and then only after a tedious process. Second, time was of
the essence and the legislature was not yet in session.
The search for a model after which Florida's post-conviction rule could
be patterned led the court to section 2255, title 28, United States Code. This
statute had served the federal courts well for fourteen years. It had accumulated an extensive body of case law, including several federal decisions upholding the constitutionality of the statute.8
Using section 2255 as a model, the Florida Supreme Court drafted and
promulgated Florida Criminal Procedure Rule Number 1. 9 This rule was
made effective April 1, 1963, just two weeks after Gideon was announced
and before the Supreme Court mandate was actually received.10 The rule
was designed to spread the base of jurisdiction by allowing a prisoner to
attack his allegedly invalid sentence in the sentencing court, which would
have the necessary fies and records. From there, the prisoner could seek
review of an adverse ruling through an orderly and established appellate
process, which would help solve the federal-state exhaustion problem.6. See Russ v. State, 110 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1959).
7. Florida Judicial Council, Eighth Annual Report 6-7 (June 30, 1963).
8. E.g., United States v. Anselmi, 207 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
902 (1954); Martin v. Hiatt, 174 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1949).
9. See Appendix I. As of January 1, 1968, "Rule One" became Rule 1.850 of the new
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. For purposes of this article, however, the rule will
be referred to as "Rule One" because this is its title in practically all the cases to be discussed and because, to thousands of Florida prisoners, it undoubtedly will remain "Rule
One," both in name and in importance.
10. In re Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1, 151 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1963).
11. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
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The Florida Supreme Court never questioned the retroactive effect of
Gideon. This was the only logical conclusion because the Gideon petition
was itself a collateral attack upon a judgment long since laid to rest under
established precedent. The basic contention of the petition was that Betts
v. Brady12 should be overruled and a new rule of law applied to Gideon's
conviction. When the United States Supreme Court accepted this contention
by reversing his conviction it had to be assumed that other Florida prisoners
were entitled to the same constitutional protection.
The period following Gideon emphasized the reality of this retroactivity
and the necessity of some type of post-conviction remedy. During the two
weeks following the announcement of Gideon, 118 habeas corpus petitions
were filed in the Florida Supreme Court, while only 300 were filed during
all of 1962.13 Between April 1, 1963, and April 1, 1966, 6,403 Florida prisoners
filed post-conviction motions. Of these, 2,506 received new trials, 1,311 were
released with no further charges, and 111 committed new crimes in Florida
and were resentenced to prison. 1 4 The Division of Corrections stopped
publishing records of this type in April 1966, but Rule One and other postconviction remedies continue to be widely used.
By adopting Rule One, Florida accepted a position of leadership among
the states in the area of post-conviction remedies. The purpose of this article
is to discuss Florida's collateral, as contrasted with direct or appellate, procedures for attacking a judgment of conviction. Rule One will be discussed
in detail because, to a great extent, it has replaced the more conventional
remedies of habeas corpus and coram nobis. These latter remedies will also
be considered, but only as they relate to Rule One.
PLEADING REQUIREMENTS UNDER RULE ONE

A Rule One motion must be directed to the court in which the conviction
15
occurred. It cannot be filed initially in an appellate court. The motion
should at least be legible, preferably printed or typed, but the rule does
not prescribe any particular form. If a similar motion has been filed, the
Rule One motion should state where the first motion was filed and its
disposition. 16 All motions should be under oath, 17 but this is a prerequisite
to relief, not to a hearing.' It would be unreasonable to deny a motion for
failure to have it verified, since many prisoners detained by the State of
Florida do not have access to an officer before whom an oath can be administered. Rather than summarily denying an otherwise adequate motion,
the trial judge should proceed with the hearing and have the prisoner verify
his motion at the first opportunity. 19
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

316 U.S. 455 (1942).
Figures taken from files in Clerk's Office, Florida Supreme Court.
Figures taken from files of Florida Division of Corrections.
Beauchamp v. State, 201 So. 2d 582 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
Roy v. Wainwright, 151 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1963).
Id.
Sampson v. State, 158 So. 2d 771 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
Ashley v. State, 158 So. 2d 530 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
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It is not necessary to obtain leave from an appellate court to file a Rule
One motion attacking a conviction affirmed by that court, although such
permission is a prerequisite to application for a writ of error coram nobis.20
The trial court should dismiss all successive motions by a prisoner if these
motions make claims that are substantially the same as those made in the
original motion filed by the same prisoner.21 But a successive motion by the
same prisoner should not be dismissed if it states even one new and suf22
ficient claim.
One basic requirement of a motion to vacate under Rule One is that
the motion state a prima facie case. That is, the motion must allege facts
23
For
that, if proved, will entitle the prisoner to have his sentence vacated.
example, in order to state a prima facie case on Gideon grounds, the following
must be alleged: (1) lack of counsel at trial or other critical stages of the
proceedings; (2) lack of intelligent waiver of the right to counsel; and (3)
indigency at time of trial.24 Some courts also have required the prisoner to
allege conviction of a felony and custody by the state, 25 but because most
motions are mailed from Raiford and written on prison stationery many
courts have logically assumed that the movant was in state custody and had
been convicted of a felony. It is uniformly recognized, however, that the
motion must allege specific facts, not mere legal conclusions.26 A motion
stating simply that the movant has been denied his rights under the 2four7
teenth amendment, or his right to counsel, may be summarily dismissed.
When a Rule One motion fails to state a prima facie case, it should be
dismissed with leave to amend within a specified time. 28 Amendments to
Rule One motions should be liberally allowed. It must be remembered that
although Rule One is not a substitute for habeas corpus, it is coextensive
therewith 29 and is entitled to the same liberality traditionally accorded
habeas corpus petitions.3 0 A Rule One motion is normally drafted by a
prisoner pro se and should not be held to the same high standard of pleading
that would be required of a motion filed by an attorney.31
A Rule One motion should not be summarily dismissed if the elements
necessary to state a prima facie case can be reasonably inferred from the
33
motion. In Hall v. State32 the prisoner filed a motion stating:
20. Solitro v. State, 166 So. 2d 474 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Ex parte Welles, 53 So. 2d
708 (Fla. 1951).
21. Fortin v. State, 203 So. 2d 207 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967); Hunt v. State, 183 So. 2d
858 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
22. Piehl v. State, 173 So. 2d 723 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1965), revid on other grounds,
184 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1965); cf. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
23. See Sampson v. State, 158 So. 2d 771 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
24. King v. State, 157 So. 2d 440 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
25. Hicks v. State, 165 So. 204 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
26. See Tynes v. State, 163 So. 2d 19 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
27. Cf. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
28. Cf. Turner v. State, 161 So. 2d 11 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
29. Gideon v. Wainwright, 153 So. 2d 299, 300 (Fla. 1963).
30. Ashley v. State, 158 So. 2d 530 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
31. Andrews v. State, 160 So. 2d 726, 727 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
32. 160 So. 2d 527 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
33. Id. at 528.
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[A]t the time of my trial, I was unable to afford the services of an
attorney for my defense and therefor [sic] pled "Guilty" for the purpose of receiving the mercy and good offices of the court in my behalf.
It was my belief, at the time, that since I was unable to provide myself
with adequate counsel for my defense and not being educationally
equipped to defend myself, that a plea of "Guilty" was the most
prudent choice.
The trial judge denied the motion without a hearing, apparently because it
did not adequately allege all the essential elements of a prima facie case under
Rule One. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed, correctly stating
that a motion drafted by a prisoner "should not be held up to scrutiny for
technical niceties."' 34 The district court concluded that it was reasonable to
infer from the facts stated in the motion that the prisoner was alleging lack
of counsel at trial, indigency, and lack of intelligent waiver of his right to
appointed counsel, the essential elements of a claim for relief on Gideon
grounds.
Rule One was intended simply as an expedient vehicle for getting the
belatedly recognized claims of prisoners before proper forums for examination and determination. If apparently meritorious claims are summarily dismissed on purely technical grounds, the purpose of the rule is defeated because the prisoner must then turn to another court for a hearing on his
post-conviction contentions.
Almost any prison-drafted petition can be found technically inadequate.
But the administration of criminal justice will be better served if trial
judges will think in terms of trying to dispose of Rule One motions on their
merits rather than on procedural shortcomings. This is often difficult because
many prisoners have little regard for the facts, and some judges therefore
become a bit cynical concerning the asserted constitutional claims of all
prisoners. This is especially true under Rule One procedure because the
trial judge who considers the motion often knows the prisoner through conducting his trial and passing the sentence he is serving. It must be remembered, however, that if a prisoner lies in his Rule One motion to the trial
court he may also lie in his habeas corpus petition to an appellate court, which
does not have the necessary files and records to determine the truth or falsity
of his allegations.
If the prisoner fails to state a prima facie case, his motion may be cured
by what is shown in the record. For example, if the record shows that the
defendant did not have counsel at trial and was not offered counsel, this
cures his failure to allege that he did not intelligently waive his right to
counsel at trial.3 5 A somewhat related problem is demonstrated by Holmes
v. State30 in which the prisoner filed a Rule One motion alleging that he was
denied his right to counsel at trial. The trial judge examined the "files and
34. Id.
35. Dixon v. State, 163 So. 2d 771 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); cf. Carnely v. Cochran, 369
U.S. 506 (1962).
36. 165 So. 2d 433 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964). See also Falagon v. State, 167 So. 2d 62 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
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records" and denied the motion on the ground that the prisoner had waived
his right to counsel by not advising the court of his indigency at the original
trial. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that since the
record also showed the prisoner was not advised of his right to appointed
counsel, he could not be required to advise the court of his indigency.
Many trial judges apparently believe that it is more expedient to look
immediately to the files and records when the prisoner's motion fails to
state a prima facie case. In this way, the judge can proceed with a hearing
if the record indicates that the prisoner may be entitled to relief. If the
record "conclusively" shows that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, his
Rule One motion may then be dismissed with prejudice to his right to
fie another similar motion. In either event, the prisoner's claims can be
disposed of in less time and probably with less judicial effort than would
ultimately be required as a result of dismissing an inadequate motion with
leave to amend or to file another motion.
The practice of looking to the files and records in each case is actually
more consistent with the language of the rule than the practice of summarily
dismissing a motion that fails to state a prima facie case. The rule provides
that a hearing shall be held "[u]nless the motion and the files and records
37
of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief."
Under this wording, it would seem that a prisoner's motion could be summarily dismissed without a hearing only when: (1) the motion fails to state
a prima facie case and (2) the files and records conclusively show that he
is entitled to no relief. This interpretation has not prevailed, however, and
it is safe to say that under existing case law a Rule One motion can be
summarily dismissed without a hearing if it fails to state a prima facie case.
Rule One procedure could be greatly improved and simplified through
promulgation of a "Rule One Form" by the Florida Supreme Court. The
Division of Corrections could make copies of the form available to all
prisoners wishing to file a Rule One motion. The form could be designed
to elicit concise answers to all questions necessary for prompt and proper
disposition of the Rule One motion, thereby saving a great deal of judicial
time and effort. Under the present system there is no uniformity whatsoever.
The motion is often illegible, disorderly, repetitious, discursive, and generally
unintelligible. Either intentionally or through ignorance, many Rule One
motions are little more than a series of am biguous conclusions interspersed
with quotations from appellate decisions. Like some habeas corpus petitions,
these motions often seem interminable and can continue for one hundred
or more pages. Quite often, the movant is genuinely unable to state concisely his grounds for relief. This problem could be alleviated by adoption
of a Rule One form. This form would contain only enough space for
categorically listing the specific facts on which the motion is based and would
require the prisoner to answer certain specific questions that are not required
to be answered under the present procedure. For example, he would have
to state whether he had taken an appeal from his original conviction and
37.

See Appendix I (emphasis added).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol20/iss3/5

6

UNIVERSITY
FLORIDA
LAW
REVIEWRemedies in Florida
[Vol. XX
Brown: OF
Collateral
Post
Conviction

whether he had filed any other similar motion or petition attacking his sentence. With these references, the trial judge might be able to determine
quickly that the grounds raised in the motion before him had already been
decided adversely to the prisoner in some other proceeding.
Some will argue that a form of this type should not be adopted because
it will encourage the filing of Rule One motions. The contrary, however,
would seem to be the more likely result. Many prisoners seem to enjoy the
drafting and filing of voluminous, repetitious post-conviction motions containing wild allegations and conclusions. Under the present procedure, there
is no way to determine quickly whether a Rule One motion is repetitious.
The prisoner can always rearrange his facts and allegations. With a form,
however, there would be a space for each specific answer, and the judge
could quickly compare the motion with any others filed by the same prisoner.
Even if the form would encourage the filing of Rule One motions, this
is not a valid argument against its adoption. The purpose of the rule is to
provide a useful vehicle for the prompt and expeditious determination of
post-conviction claims. If the prisoner's allegations have merit, he should be
allowed to present them in a fair and orderly manner without the technical
pitfalls built into the present procedure. It is simply unrealistic to require
a legally untrained, and often uneducated, prisoner to draft his own Rule
One pleading. Such a requirement does not aid the administration of justice
and it certainly does not strengthen the operation of Rule One. It is recommended, therefore, that the Florida Supreme Court promulgate as an addendum to Rule One a form similar to that set forth at the conclusion of
this article a
EXAMINATION OF THE FILES AND REcoRDs

As discussed above, Rule One requires a hearing "[u]nless the motion
and the files and records conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to
no relief .... ." This creates a presumption in favor of a hearing in each
case. Because of this presumption, it is important to determine what is included within the term "files and records" and what inferences may be drawn
from their content.
Letters from the prisoner and parole reports cannot be considered as part
of the files and records3 9 Also, an affidavit by an attorney filed with the
prosecuting attorney's answer is not a part of the files and records; this is
41
0
simply evidence to be considered at the hearing.4 In Richardson v. State,
the county solicitor filed an unverified written summary of the trial proceeding
made by a court reporter twenty years after the trial. This summary stated
38. See Appendix II. This form is substantially similar to that used successfully for
many years by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in
handling motions under 28 U.S.C. §2255 (1964). A form of this type could also improve
Florida's habeas corpus procedure, but that reform must await another day.
39. Horton v. State, 170 So. 2d 470 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964), cert. denied, 174 So. 2d 33
(1965).
40. Sampson v. State, 158 So. 2d 771 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
41. 168 So. 2d 765 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1964). See also Murphy v. State, 166 So. 2d 759 (Ist
D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
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that the prisoner had counsel at trial, but the First, District Court of Appeal
held it could not be considered as part of the files and records so as to deny
a hearing.
One recurring problem under Rule One procedure involves the question
whether a trial judge can rely upon his memory or personal knowledge in
summarily denying a prisoner's motion. Some trial judges are inclined to
simply deny a motion without a hearing when they remember from conducting the trial that the prisoner either had counsel or waived his right
to counsel. This procedure, however, is not permissible under the rule. The
memory of the trial judge cannot serve as the basis for denying a Rule One
motion without a hearing. 42 The record must conclusively show that the
prisoner is entitled to no relief. 43 It is not sufficient that the files and records
seem to prove, or strongly indicate, that the prisoner has no valid claim.
Dismissing a Rule One motion without a hearing is akin to granting a summary judgment. It is a judicial holding that there are no factual issues to be
determined and that the prisoner is not entitled to relief as a matter of law.
If the files and records conclusively show that the prisoner voluntarily and
intelligently waived his right to counsel, a Rule One motion based on Gideon
grounds should be summarily dismissed. But the question of what constitutes
a conclusive showing of waiver has raised quite a few problems under Rule
One.
The standard statement found in many records is that the defendant "does
not have counsel and does not desire counsel." During the early stages of
Rule One development, the Courts of Appeal of the First and Second Districts
arrived at opposite conclusions in deciding whether this language conclusively
showed a waiver. The first district rather consistently held that it did, while
4
the second district consistently held that the language was inconclusive. The
5
first district had recognized an exception in one case involving a minor.4
The problem was finally resolved by the Florida Supreme Court in Mason
v. State.46 The trial court in that case summarily denied Mason's Rule One
motion with an order reciting the following portion of the record: "[UTpon
inquiry by the court to each defendant as to whether they had counsel or
desired counsel, each defendant announced that he was without counsel and
did not desire the same." There were two defendants. The First District
Court of Appeal affirmed, holding the record was sufficient to conclusively
establish a waiver. The supreme court reversed, pointing out that there was
no showing in the record that Mason was advised of his right to appointed
counsel. The court reasoned that without such a showing the trial court
could not conclusively and summarily determine that Mason had made an
42. E.g., Beadles v. State, 162 So. 2d 4 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
43. Quillian v. State, 163 So. 2d 1 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964). Cf. Baker v. State, 202 So. 2d
563 (Fla. 1967) in which the supreme court held that two codefendants were denied their
right to effective counsel by the appointment of two attorneys to represent them jointly

rather than severally.
44.
So. 2d
45.
46.

See, e.g., Hale v. State, 162 So. 2d 5 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Flemming v. State, 165
261 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
Mullins v. State, 157 So. 2d 701 (Ist D.CA. Fla. 1963).
176 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1965).
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intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. Since Mason's trial was prior to
Gideon it would have been illogical to conclusively assume that he intended
to waive his then unknown "right" to appointed counsel. How could he
"waive" a nonexistent, or at least judicially unrecognized, right? It would
have been just as reasonable to assume that Mason's statement "that he was
without counsel and did not desire the same" meant that he was without
hired counsel and did not desire to hire same, knowing that he could not
47
afford to do so.

The Mason decision has the effect of impliedly overruling several other
cases involving slightly different statements in the records. For example, in
Spriggs v. State48 the record showed that the defendant, who had an eighth
grade education, stated that he did "not require the services of counsel
before entering a plea." The First District Court of Appeal affirmed a summary dismissal of the defendant's Rule One motion, holding the record was
sufficient to conclusively show a waiver. In light of the holding and rationale
of Mason, however, it is doubtful that such a statement in the record could
now be held to conclusively establish a waiver.
It is difficult to see how a Rule One motion can ever be summarily dismissed on the basis of competent waiver unless the record affirmatively shows
the defendant was advised of his rights. A record that is silent on the
question of knowledge cannot "conclusively show" that a defendant made
a knowing and intelligent waiver. This, apparently, is the rationale underlying decisions holding that a silent record does not create a presumption of
waiver, 49 and that a waiver cannot be presumed from a plea of guilty. 50 Even
if the record conclusively shows that the prisoner waived his right to counsel
at trial, it cannot be assumed that this right was waived at other critical
stages of the proceedings. 51
If a Rule One motion is to be summarily dismissed because of a competent waiver, this waiver must affirmatively appear on the face of the "files and
records." It is not permissible for the trial judge to independently investigate
the waiver question and then summarily deny a Rule One motion on the
basis of this investigation.52 If an investigation is needed, it should be in
the form of a hearing as provided by the Rule. It is also not permissible for
the trial judge to rely upon his own knowledge of the case as the primary
basis for denying a Rule One motion due to waiver when this waiver is not
5 3
supported by the record.
A basic distinction must be drawn between a waiver of the right to
appointed counsel at trial and a waiver of the right to appointed counsel
47. Cf. Merritt v. State, 165 So. 2d 245 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
48. 158 So. 2d 786 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
49. King v. State, 157 So. 2d 440 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S.
506 (1962).
50. E.g., Dortch v. State, 165 So. 2d 409 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
51. Fulmore v. State, 198 So. 2d 101 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967) (right to counsel at
sentencing).
52. Caminita v. State, 159 So. 2d 921 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); cf. Keur v. State, 160 So. 2d
546 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
53. Beadles v. State, 162 So. 2d 4 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
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on direct appeal. At trial, the court is under an affirmative duty to advise an
indigent defendant of his right to counsel. If the files and records do not
show that such advice was given or that the defendant definitely knew of his
right to appointed counsel, a summary dismissal of a Rule One motion because of competent waiver would be improper. But different standards are
applied to the question whether a defendant has waived his right to appointed
counsel on direct appeal. For Rule One purposes the present state of the
law seems to be that a defendant can inadvertently waive his right to counsel
on appeal,5 4 but that waiver of the right to counsel at trial requires a knowing
and intelligent waiver. This dichotomy, however, will probably be shortlived. With criminal due process expanding at such a rapid pace it seems
only a matter of time until the requirement for advice is extended to the
appellate arena.
GRouNDs FOR RELIEF UNDER RuLE ONE

It is impossible to formulate a precise rule defining those situations that
entitle a prisoner to relief under Rule One. The rule provides that a prisoner
may seek relief on any of four grounds: (1) that the sentence was imposed
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of the State
of Florida, (2) that the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction, (3) that the
sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or (4) that the
sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. Generally, it may be said
that the above four categories do not provide relief for the so-called "technical" errors that may have occurred at trial. Rule One is not a substitute for
direct appeal; consequently, many errors that would constitute grounds for appeal cannot be considered under a Rule One attack. 55 The rule was designed
to allow relief only for those "organic" errors that deprived the prisoner of a
fair trial or basic fairness at some critical stage of the proceedings. In order
to define more specifically the types of errors the courts have considered
organic under Rule One, it is necessary to discuss the various cases that have
interpreted the rule.
Denial of Counsel at Trial
The courts have uniformly recognized that the denial of an indigent
defendant's right to counsel at a trial which results in conviction of a felony
is a sufficient ground for relief under Rule One.58 In Fish v. State,57 however, the Florida Supreme Court held that an indigent defendant accused
of a misdemeanor does not have a right to court-appointed counsel and that
a Rule One motion based upon this ground should be denied. One year
later the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reached a contrary conclusion in
Harvey v. Mississippi,58 holding that an indigent defendant accused of a mis54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Burchil v. State, 205 So. 2d 9 (Sd D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
See Austin v. State, 160 So. 2d 730 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
E.g., King v. State, 157 So. 2d 440 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
159 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1964).
340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965).
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demeanor does have a constitutional right to appointed counsel. This holding
was quickly reaffirmed in McDonald v. Moore, 9 a federal misdemeanor case
arising in Florida. The Harvey and McDonald cases caused some temporary
confusion as to the law on this point in Florida; but it is now firmly
established that the rule in Florida state courts is that an indigent defendant
charged with a misdemeanor does not have a right to appointed counsel. 6°
In Watkins v. Morris,61 the Florida Supreme Court summarized its position
as follows: "[U]ntil authoritatively determined to the contrary by the Supreme
Court of the United States, the rule in Florida is that there is no absolute,
organic right to counsel in misdemeanor trials." 6 - Therefore, an indigent
prisoner's allegation that he was denied his right to counsel at a misdemeanor
trial does not state a ground for relief under Rule One.

It should be noted, however, that such a prisoner may still be able to
obtain post-conviction relief in federal court. In Rutledge v. City of Miami,63
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida released
a state prisoner on a writ of habeas corpus, holding that he was not properly
informed of his right to appointed counsel at his misdemeanor trial in the
Miami Municipal Court. In so holding, the court stated that the prisoner
was not required to exhaust his remedies under Rule One or by state habeas
corpus because the Florida state courts do not recognize a right to appointed
counsel in misdemeanor trials.
Denial of Counsel at "CriticalStage"
Denial of counsel at arraignment does not constitute a ground for relief
under Rule One unless the prisoner is able to show that he was so prejudiced
by the denial as to make the arraignment a "critical stage" in the proceedings.64 Arraignment becomes a "critical stage" for Rule One purposes if the
prisoner makes incriminating statements or enters a guilty plea. 65 But if the
prisoner changes his guilty plea at trial, denial of counsel at arraignment when
the plea was entered does not constitute a sufficient ground for relief under
the rule.66 Moreover, the denial of counsel during an arraignment at which
a guilty plea is entered is considered to be waived if the accused appears at
trial with privately retained counsel and makes no attempt to change his
guilty plea.

59.

67

353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965).

60. State ex rel. Taylor v. Warden of Orange County Prison Farm, 193 So. 2d 606 (Fla.
1967).
61.

179 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1965).

62. Id. at 349. See Winters v. Beck, 239 Ark. 1151, 397 S.W.2d 364 (1965), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 907.
63. 267 F. Supp. 885 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
64. Sardinia v. State, 168 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1964).
65. Murray v. State, 191 So. 2d 278 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1966); Harris v. State, 162 So. 2d
262 (Fla. 1964).
66. Gobie v. State, 188 So. 2d 33 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966); Sampson v. State, 177 So. 2d
543 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
67. Sardinia v. State, 168 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1964).
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The same basic rules apply to the preliminary hearing. If the defendant
can show hewas prejudiced by lack of counsel at the preliminary hearing, the
hearing becomes a "critical stage" in the proceedings for purposes of a Rule
One motion.68 Unless such prejudice is shown, denial of counsel at a preliminary hearing is not a sufficient ground for relief under the rule.69 Also,
complete failure to provide a preliminary hearing does not constitute a basis
for Rule One relief unless the prisoner is able to show that he was prejudiced
by this failure. 70
A hearing at which the prisoner is placed on probation is not a "critical
stage" of the proceedings. A hearing to determine if probation has been violated is also not a "critical stage" of the proceedings. Thus, the denial of
counsel at either type of probation hearing is not a sufficient ground for
relief under Rule One.71 The longevity of this rule seems questionable, however, in light of the rapidly expanding concepts of due process in the probation area.
The time of sentencing is deemed to be a "critical stage" of the proceedings
as a matter of law. Therefore, a prisoner is not required to allege or prove
resulting prejudice in order to obtain Rule One relief on the basis of denial
of counsel at sentencing. 72 The remedy in this situation is not a complete
new trial. Instead, the prisoner is entitled to 73have his sentence vacated and
a new sentence entered, with counsel present.
Denialof "Effective" Counsel
A prisoner may have his sentence vacated under Rule One for lack of
effective counsel if he is able to prove that his appointed counsel was so
incompetent that the trial became a farce or a mockery.74 This is a heavy
burden of proof. It is not sufficient to show that the appointed attorney
made an obvious tactical blunder75 or that he exercised very poor judgment.7 6
Instead, the requirement seems to be that the prisoner prove his appointed
7
counsel was so incompetent as to constitute almost no representation at all. 7
A prisoner cannot use Rule One to attack the competency of a privately
68. Williams v. State, 184 So. 2d 525 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1966). Accord, Rollins v. State,
194 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 1967); cf. Harris v. State, 162 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 1964) in which the
Florida Supreme Court reversed a death sentence on substantially similar grounds.
69. Fauls v. State, 164 So. 2d 35 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Brookins v. State, 174 So. 2d
578 (8d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
70. Wallace v. State, 184 So. 2d 443 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
71. Thomas v. State, 163 So. 2d 328 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Randall v. State, 188 So. 2d
334 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
72. Bryant v. State, 194 So. 2d 21 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1967).
73. Langlois v. State, 191 So. 2d 284 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1966).
74. Gillyard v. State, 175 So. 2d 798 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965); cf. Carroll v. State, 172 So.
2d 266 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965), appeal dismissed, 177 So. 2d 11 (1965).
75. Whitney v. State, 152 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1963).
76. Simpson v. State, 164 So. 2d 224 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964), appeal dismissed, 169 So.
2d 383 (1964); Thomas v. State, 190 So. 2d 361 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
77. See Frand v. United States, 301 F.2d 102 (10th Cir. 1962); Black v. United States,
269 F.2d 38 (9th Cir. 1959).
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retained attorney. 8 The courts have reasoned that a defendant who selects
and retains a particular attorney waives the right to question the competency
79
of that attorney.
Rather than alleging general incompetency of counsel, many prisoners
have filed Rule One motions claiming they were prejudiced by specific acts
or omissions by their attorneys. In Stratos v. State,80 the prisoner filed a motion alleging that he was denied the assistance of witnesses by the statement
of his court appointed attorney that the state would not pay the cost of
summoning these witnesses, this statement being contrary to section 932.37
of the Florida Statutes. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed a trial
court denial of the motion, holding that this allegation did state a sufficient
ground for collateral attack under Rule One. The Stratos case should be
distinguished from the numerous cases holding that the decision not to call
witnesses on behalf of the defense is a matter of personal judgment to be
81
exercised by defense counsel and is not a ground for relief under Rule One.
82
In Cole v. State, the prisoner filed a Rule One motion alleging that his
privately retained attorney had waived his right to be present at trial in a
noncapital felony case without his knowledge or acquiescence. The trial court
summarily denied the motion, but the Third District Court of Appeal
reversed, holding that this allegation was sufficient to require a hearing under
Rule One. It seems doubtful that Cole could have withstood an attack on the
merits in the Florida Supreme Court. The right to be present whenever the
jury is in the box can be waived in any noncapital case. This does not seem
to be such a fundamental right that it cannot be waived by the defendant's
privately retained attorney, even without the defendant's knowledge or acquiescence. Certainly it does not appear so prejudicial as to subject a judgment to collateral attack. As the Cole decision now stands, however, it represents a refinement of the general rule that a prisoner cannot collaterally attack
the competency of private counsel. Perhaps a better statement of the rule
would be that a prisoner cannot attack the general competency of his privately
retained attorney, but, in exceptional circumstances, he can obtain Rule One
relief by showing that his attorney committed some specific act that severely
prejudiced his right to a fair trial.
A mere allegation that counsel was appointed on the day of trial does not
state a sufficient ground for relief under Rule One when there are no factual
allegations as to how this deprived the prisoner of a fair trial and the record
reflects that the attorney was given time for preparation prior to trial.83 A
different result is reached, however, when the lawyer is appointed as the trial

78. Swindle v. State, 202 So. 2d 132 (3d D.G.A. Fla. 1967). But see Cole v. State, 181
So. 2d 698 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
79. Todd v. State, 176 So. 2d 344 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
80. 167 So. 2d 771 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
81. E.g., Simpson v. State, 164 So. 2d 224 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964), appeal dismissed, 169
So. 2d 383 (1964); Walker v. State, 201 So. 2d 818 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
82. 181 So. 2d 698 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966). See also Cole v. State, 199 So. 2d 480 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
83. State v. Barton, 194 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 1967).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1968

13

1968]

Florida Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1968], Art. 5

POST CONVICTION REMEDIES IN FLORIDA

commences 4 or is otherwise given inadequate time for preparation. 5
A prisoner can obtain Rule One relief by showing that his appointed
attorney refused to prosecute an appeal from his conviction, if he specifically
alleges in the motion that some error occurred at his trial.87 The prisoner
may also be able to obtain reversal of his conviction under Rule One by
proving that he was denied the right to appeal because of his inability to
communicate with the public defender's office.88 It is not sufficient, however,
to simply allege that the public defender refused to furnish a transcript of the
trial when there is no allegation of any attempt to appeal.8 9
Reliance upon statements or promises made by defense counsel is generally not an adequate ground for collateral attack under Rule One. An
allegation that a defendant was induced to plead guilty by promises made to
him by his privately employed attorney is not sufficient to state a prima
facie case under Rule One. 90 Similarly, a prima facie case is not created by the
prisoner's allegation that he pleaded guilty in reliance upon his retained attorney's expression of belief that a guilty plea would result in leniency. 91
A contention that the prisoner's attorney was ineffective because she was too
92
worried and excited at trial to assist him is likewise without merit.
PrejudicialAction by State
Unwarranted action by the prosecuting attorney has often been advanced
as a ground for relief under Rule One. In Brown v. State,93 the Third
District Court of Appeal held that the use of perjured testimony by the state
attorney, when he knew the testimony was perjured, was sufficient to justify
relief under the rule. This is true even though the conviction has been
affirmed on appeal, when the use of perjured testimony was not raised in that
appeal.94 No relief will be granted upon a mere showing that perjured testimony was used at trial when there is no evidence that the prosecutor knew
the testimony was perjured.95 Moreover, it is not sufficient to simply allege
that the state knowingly used perjured testimony. To state a prima facie case

84. Watson v. State, 169 So. 2d 887 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); cf. House v. Mayo, 324 U.S.
42 (1944).
85. French v. State, 161 So. 2d 879 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
86. Hinton v. State, 177 So. 2d 522 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965); Jackson v. State, 166 So. 2d
194 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
87. Murray v. State, 191 So. 2d 292 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
88. See Alderman v. State, 188 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1966).
89. Maisonave v. State, 171 So. 2d 443 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
90. Manning v. State, 176 So. 2d 380 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965); Thomas v. State, 172 So. 2d
245 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
91. Baker v. State, 188 So. 2d 346 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966); Pait v. State, 188 So. 2d 15
(3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
92. Brown v. State, 164 So. 2d 34 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
93. 163 So. 2d 335 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); see Smith v. United States, 259 F.2d 125
(9th Cir. 1958).
94. Rayburn v. State, 203 So. 2d 212 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
95. Gilliard v. State, 171 So. 2d 902 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1965).
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the prisoner must set forth specific factual allegations, such as which testimony
was perjured.96
In Paul v. State,97 the prisoner's Rule One motion alleged he pleaded
guilty to four informations for forgery only because of the state attorney's
promise that the sentence for forgery would run concurrently with that imposed on a robbery conviction. The prisoner further alleged the sentences
had not been made to run concurrently. The trial court summarily denied
the motion and the Third District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that
these allegations, if true, would entitle the prisoner to relief under the rule.
In Young v. State,9 the prisoner asserted that the assistant state attorney
who prosecuted him had previously counseled him regarding the same crime
while serving as an assistant public defender. The Second District Court of
Appeal held the prisoner was entitled to a hearing on this allegation and
that his sentence should be vacated if the allegation could be proved. The
Young decision should be distinguished from Todd v. State. 9 In that case,
the defendant's privately retained attorney was appointed as an assistant state
attorney after trial but before judgment and sentence were imposed. The
defendant then hired another lawyer, who expressly waived any objection the
defendant might have to the state attorney's office representing the state at
the time judgment and sentence was imposed. Under these circumstances, the
Second District Court of Appeal held the defendant was not entitled to post.
conviction relief under Rule One. Todd is distinguishable from Young on
three grounds: (1) Todd's defense counsel was appointed assistant state
attorney after the trial, while the attorney who counseled Young was the
same attorney who prosecuted the entire case; (2) Todd, on the advice of
counsel, expressly waived any possible disqualification, while in Young there
was no waiver; and (3) Todd's defense counsel was privately retained, while
Young's was supplied by the state.
Comment by the prosecuting attorney on the defendant's failure to testify
is a fundamental error that constitutes a ground for relief under Rule One. 10o
However, prejudicial comments by the prosecutor during closing argument on
matters other than the defendant's failure to testify are not sufficient to support a collateral attack under Rule One.10 ' An allegation that the prosecutor
suppressed certain testimony is also inadequate to justify relief under the
1 0
rule. 2

An allegation that a guilty plea was obtained by a police officer's coercion
is sufficient to state a prima facie case under Rule One.103 This is true even
though the defendant was represented by an appointed or a privately retained

96.
97.
98.

House v. State, 199 So. 2d 134 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
165 So. 2d 779 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
177 So. 2d 345 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).

99. 176 So. 2d 344 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
100. Burse v. State, 175 So. 2d 586 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965); see Gordon v. State, 104 So.
2d 524 (Fla. 1958); cf. State v. Jones, 204 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1967).
101. House v. State, 199 So. 2d 134 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1967).

102. Id.
103.

Lee v. State, 175 So. 2d 95 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1968

15

1968]

Florida LawREMEDIES
Review, Vol.
Iss. 3 [1968], Art. 5
POST CONVICTION
IN20,
FLORIDA

attorney at the trial.10' It has been held, however, that an allegation that the
police promised the defendant that charges against him would be dropped if
he turned state's evidence was insufficient to support a collateral attack, when
this contention was raised for the first time in the Rule One motion.0 5 The
failure to advise a defendant of his rights before taking a confession, as now
required by Mirandav. Arizona0 0 is not a basis for Rule One relief in those
cases in which the defendant's trial began prior to June 13, 1966, the day
0
Mirandawas decided. 7
In Reddick v. State,18 Rule One relief was granted to a defendant who
showed his guilty plea was indirectly coerced by the trial judge. Reddick and
two codefendants were charged with murder. The three defendants filed
individual motions for severance, but these motions were denied. Prior to
trial, at a conference with Reddick's attorney and the state attorney, the trial
judge made statements which strongly indicated that he would impose a
sentence of life imprisonment if Reddick would plead guilty. Relying upon
these statements, Reddick changed his plea from not guilty to guilty. He.
and his codefendants, who were convicted on pleas of not guilty, were then
sentenced to death in the electric chair. The codefendants appealed to the
Florida Supreme Court, which reversed their convictions, holding that the
denial of their motions for severance was a gross abuse of discretion. Reddick
then filed a Rule One motion in the trial court, which was denied after a
brief hearing. On appeal from this denial, the Second District Court of
Appeal reversed with directions that Reddick be given a new trial. After
reviewing the pretrial colloquy between the attorneys and the trial judge, the
district court held that Reddick had been indirectly coerced into pleading
guilty by the judge.
The Reddick decision also held that the trial judge committed fundamental error in denying Reddick's motion for severance, and that this error
could be reached under Rule One. The court recognized that the denial of
a motion for severance would not support a collateral attack in many cases,20 9
but held that this error could be remedied through Rule One "under the
peculiarly aggravating facts of this particular case."'110 The court emphasized
the significance of the motion for severance by pointing out that one of Reddick's codefendants was convicted of only second-degree murder on retrial
and that the other codefendant was allowed to plead guilty to second-degree
murder.
In Byers v. State,"' the Third District Court of Appeal held that the trial
court erred in summarily denying a Rule One motion which alleged that the
sentencing court had refused compulsory process to obtain witnesses to testify
104.
105.
106.
107.
182 (2d
108.
109.
110.
111.

Bennett v. State, 203 So. 2d 211 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
Baker v. State, 188 So. 2d 583 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Stone v. State, 201 So. 2d 472 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1967); Cameron v. State, 196 So. 2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1967); see Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
190 So. 2d 340 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
See Amaral v. State, 171 So. 2d 549 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
Reddick v. State, 190 So. 2d 340, 349 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
163 So. 2d 57 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
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on the defendant's behalf. The movant did not allege specific facts in support
of the motion. A motion that simply sets forth the ground as a bare legal
112
conclusion, with no supporting facts, can be summarily dismissed.

Although it would be ground for reversal on direct appeal, an instruction
to the jury that a defendant convicted of first-degree murder with a recommendation of mercy could be eligible for parole is not a sufficient basis for
collateral attack under Rule One. 113 No relief will be granted under Rule
One upon a showing that the trial court refused to provide a court reporter
4
at trial, even though the defendant's attorney requested that one be present."
A prisoner may be able to obtain Rule One relief by showing that he was
an unmarried minor at the time of his trial and that his parents were not
notified of the trial as required by section 932.38 of the Florida Statutes." 5
It is not sufficient, however, to prove that the parents of an unmarried minor
defendant were not notified of a retrial, if they were notified of the original
trial."n Of course, this ground cannot be raised in a Rule One motion if a
habeas corpus petition based on the same allegation has previously been
denied on the merits."1

In Phillips v. State,"' the prisoner filed a Rule One motion alleging
that his sentence, which was imposed after the revocation of his probation,
was invalid because he was not afforded a hearing in connection with the
probation revocation as required by section 948.06 (1) of the Florida Statutes.
The trial court denied the motion and the Second District Court of Appeal
reversed, holding that the sentence was void and that Phillips was entitled
to a hearing on his probation revocation.
Many errors involving the deprivation of constitutional rights have been
held insufficient to constitute a ground for relief under Rule One. Among
these are: (1) an illegal arrest;"19 (2) an illegal search and seizure;120 (3) lack
of a speedy trial; 21 (4) denial of bail;122 (5) delay in taking the defendant
before a committing magistrate, when no prejudice is shown; 23 and (6) the
systematic exclusion of members of the defendant's race from grand and
24
petit juries, when this is raised for the first time in a Rule One attack."
112. Walker v. State, 201 So. 2d 818 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
113. Williams v. State, 184 So. 2d 525 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1966); cf. Burnette v. State, 157
So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1963).
114. Lee v. State, 165 So. 2d 443 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
115. See Colebrook v. State, 191 So. 2d 309 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966); Miles v. State, 174
So. 2d 576 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
116. Falagon v. State, 186 So. 2d 804 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
117. See Mitchell v. State, 203 So. 2d 676 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
118. 165 So. 2d 246 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
119. See Hall v. State, 183 So. 2d 277 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966), cert. denied, 188 So. 2d
816 (1966).

120. Duncan v. State, 161 So. 2d 718 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
121. Marti v. State, 163 So. 2d 506 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); see Kemp v. State, 177 So.
2d 58 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
122. Anderson v. State, 164 So. 2d 887 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
123. Marti v. State, 163 So. 2d 506 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
124. House v. State, 199 So. 2d 134 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1967); Lee v. State, 178 So. 2d 520
(Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
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These are all serious constitutional deficiencies, but they have not been considered sufficiently prejudicial to support a collateral attack under Rule One.
Miscellaneous Groundsfor Relief
In Knight v. State,12 5 the prisoner filed a Rule One motion alleging his
sentence should be vacated because he was mentally incompetent at the time
of his trial. This motion specifically alleged he had received treatment for
mental disorders on three occasions prior to his trial. The trial court summarily denied the motion, and the Third District Court of Appeal reversed,
holding the movant was entitled to a hearing to determine whether his sentence should be vacated due to his having been mentally incompetent at
the time of trial. The fact that the prisoner in Knight made specific allegations concerning his history of mental illness is significant. In a subsequent
decision involving similar facts, the third district held that a motion based
on insanity at time of trial was properly dismissed when there were no allegations and no showing in the record of any type of prior mental illness. 2 0
Similarly, it is not sufficient to show that a defendant was adjudged insane
prior to trial, when the record also shows that this fact was made known to
the court and jury, and that the jury found he was sane after presentation
of evidence on this point by the state and appropriate instructions by the
court.

27

Thus, it appears that insanity at time of trial is not a ground for relief
under Rule One unless the prisoner is able to show some history of mental
illness prior to trial. If he is able to show some type of prior mental disorder,
he may be able to obtain a hearing on his motion. At this hearing the
prisoner has the substantial burden of proving that he was insane at the
time of his trial. The above rule may seem rather dubious, but a more
definitive one cannot be formulated from existing case law.
Excessive publicity prior to trial may be sufficient to entitle a prisoner
to Rule One relief if he is able to show it was so excessive that he was deprived of a fair trial.128 There is presently no basis for relief on this ground
when the record shows that no motion for change of venue was made and
that some peremptory challenges were not used. 2 9
A prisoner cannot obtain Rule One relief on the ground that he was
brought into the state under illegal extradition proceedings, when the record
shows that he pleaded guilty at trial.130 Also, a prisoner is not entitled to
relief upon an allegation that he was not furnished with a copy of the indictment pursuant to sections 906.28 and 940.04 of the Florida Statutes, when
there is no allegation that he applied for a copy.' 31 There is, of course, no
125.
126.
127.
128.

164 So. 2d 229 (Sd D.CA. Fla. 1964).
Rodriguez v. State, 176 So. 2d 516 (Sd D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
Boone v. State, 183 So. 2d 869 (1st D.CA. Fla. 1966).
See Brooks v. State, 188 So. 2d 883 (4th D.CA. Fla. 1966); cf. Singer v. State, 109

So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1959).
129. Whitney v. State, 184 So. 2d 207 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1966), appeal docketed, 386 U.S.
970 (1967).
10. Hunter v. State, 174 So. 2d 415 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
131. Shannon v. State, 172 So. 2d 479 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
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merit to a prisoner's contention that his sentence for second-degree murder
should be 32vacated because he was charged by information rather than indictment.1

A prisoner can obtain Rule One relief by showing that he pleaded
guilty to one crime under the mistaken belief that he was pleading guilty
to another unrelated crime.1 33 Of course, there is no basis for relief in the
contention that a prisoner's guilty plea was involuntary because he had
3
previously confessed.1 4
It is impossible to formulate a precise rule defining those situations that
entitle a prisoner to have his sentence vacated under Rule One. The basic
question to be determined in each case is whether the prisoner was deprived
of his fundamental right to a fair and impartial trial, not whether he was
deprived of some specific constitutional guaranty.
In determining the specific grounds that constitute bases for Rule One
relief it is necessary to consider the appellate decisions interpreting the Rule,
as discussed above. However, there are other sources of case law that are
very helpful in this regard. It must be remembered that Rule One is coextensive with habeas corpus and that, generally, the same type of showing
is required to obtain Rule One relief as is required to gain relief by postconviction habeas corpus. Therefore, a Florida decision either granting or
denying post-conviction habeas corpus relief on a particular ground can be
quite persuasive in arguing that Rule One relief should or should not be
granted on the same or similar ground. Cases interpreting section 2255,
title 28, U.S. Code, are also quite useful in determining the types of errors
that are sufficient to justify relief under the rule.
THE RULE ONE HEARING

If the prisoner's Rule One motion states a prima facie case, which is not
conclusively refuted by the record, the prisoner is entitled to a hearing on his
motion. The rule provides that notice shall be served on the prosecuting
attorney of the court if a hearing is required, so that he can file a reply and
defend the state's position at the hearing. 135 The prisoner has no absolute

right to be present at the hearing, but either he or his attorney must be
present if testimony is taken. 136 If the prisoner is brought to the hearing,
the transportation expenses must be borne by the county in which the hearing

is held.137
The question whether an indigent prisoner has a right to appointed
counsel at the Rule One hearing is one that must be determined on the facts
of each particular case. If an attorney is essential to accomplish a fair and
132. Portee v. State, 176 So. 2d 585 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
133. Blake v. State, 171 So. 2d 207 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
134. Weeks v. State, 201 So. 2d 764 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967); see Taylor v. State, 169 So.
2d 861 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
135. Note the analogy between this and habeas corpus procedure.
136. Lambert v. State, 169 So. 2d 374 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Dickens v. State, 165 So.
2d 811 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
137. Wainwright v. Gillis, 166 So. 2d 770 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1964).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1968

19

1968]

Florida Law Review,
Vol.IN
20,FLORIDA
Iss. 3 [1968], Art. 5
REMEDIES
POST CONVICTION

thorough presentation of the prisoner's claims, then due process requires
that an attorney be appointed.138 All doubts as to the need for an attorney
should be resolved in the prisoner's favor. 139 Under this rule of resolving
all doubts in the prisoner's favor there would seem to be very few cases
that do not require the appointment of counsel. Most Rule One allegations
are not so simple that they can be adequately and thoroughly presented by
an indigent prisoner untrained in the law. Clearly it is an abuse of discretion not to appoint counsel for a prisoner whose motion involves "delicate
14
and technical constitutional questions."' o
The Rule One hearing is an adversary proceeding at which both sides
are given an opportunity to offer evidence and to present arguments.14 No
42
jury is involved, so the court must determine all legal and factual issues.'
The prisoner has the burden of proving each essential allegation of his
motion. These allegations must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt.'1' There is no absolute right to a
transcript of the original trial proceedings to assist the prisoner in proving
his allegations. 41 Fundamental fairness and due process would seem to dictate, however, that an indigent prisoner is entitled to those portions of the
transcript directly relating to his specific claims for relief, provided that a
reporter was present at trial so that a transcript can be prepared. 145 If the
Rule One motion is granted, and the sentence is vacated, the prisoner is not
automatically discharged from custody but may be held for a new trial.14 6
Soon after the promulgation of Rule One, a distinguished authority on
Florida criminal law, Professor Vernon Clark, expressed the view that the
rule should be revised to assure that the judge who sentenced the prisoner
originally would not be called upon to consider his motion to vacate that
sentence. 147 Experience has shown that this recommendation has merit. In
Reddick v. State,' 48 previously discussed, the prisoner was placed in the
impossible position of having to file his Rule One motion with the same
trial judge who had allegedly coerced the prisoner into pleading guilty. The
motion was denied, of course, with an order that the Second District Court of
Appeal described as merely "an attempt to justify the acts of the Judge and
149
the course of the pre-trial proceedings generally."'
138.
1 (1963),
§2255.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
(1963).
146.
147.
(1963).
148.
149.

State v. Weeks, 166 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1964); cf. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S.
which held there is no absolute right to counsel in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C.
State v. Weeks, 166 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1964).
Harper v. State, 201 So. 2d 65, 67 (Fla. 1967).
Kelly v. State, 175 So. 2d 542 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
See Rollins v. State, 179 So. 2d 377 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
Leeds v. State, 187 So. 2d 77 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1966).
Harper v. State, 168 So. 2d 325 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
Cf. Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); cf. Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420
OPs. ATr'y GEN. 063-62 (1963).
Clark, Curable Ills of the Criminal Law of Florida, 16 U. FLA. L. Rv. 258, 294-99
190 So. 2d 340 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
Id. at 342.
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The Reddick case is an extreme example of the prejudice that can result
from the requirement in Rule One that the motion to vacate must be filed
with "the court which imposed the sentence."' 150 But there are many other
cases in which this requirement results in lesser degrees of partiality. In practically all cases, the Rule One movant must allege that his sentence is void
because of some fundamental and highly prejudicial error that occurred at,
or at least permeated, his trial. This creates an awkward situation when
the judge who must consider the alleged error is the same judge who must
bear responsibility for having allowed the error initially. This is almost as
improper as designating a sentencing court to hear an appeal from that
sentence. Even the most impartial trial judge must find it difficult to be totally
objective when considering the question whether he imposed a sentence
notwithstanding some fundamental error. Moreover, the sentencing judge,
having presided at trial, may be personally convinced of the prisoner's guilt.
Under these circumstances, he is not in an ideal position to apply the rule,
basic to Rule One procedure, that the guilt or innocence of the prisoner is
totally irrelevant. 151
The requirement that a Rule One motion be filed with the sentencing
court also makes it difficult to restrict consideration of the motion to the
"files and records" or the evidence adduced at the hearing, as required by
the rule. The judge who presided at the original trial often has an intimate
knowledge of the case and is inclined to grant or deny a motion on the
basis of his own memory. Numerous cases have been reversed because the
judge denied relief upon his personal "knowledge" of the case rather than
the files and records or the evidence taken at the Rule One hearing.152
Supreme Court amend
It is recommended, therefore, that the Florida
153
language:
following
the
deleting
Rule One by
[M]ay move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set
aside or correct the sentence ....
and substituting the following therefor:
[M]ay file, with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of the county in which
the sentence was imposed, a motion to vacate, set aside or correct the
sentence. The senior judge of the circuit shall assign consideration of
the motion to any trial judge of the court which imposed the sentence, or
to any trial judge of a higher court within the county having criminal
jurisdiction; provided, however, that in no case shall the judge who imposed the sentence receive the assignment, unless the sentence was imposed
by a circuit court in a circuit having only one circuit judge.

150. This language has been interpreted to mean that the motion must be filed with
the same judge "which imposed the sentence" in those cases in which the particular court
has more than one judge, and the sentencing judge is still sitting.
151. Dickens v. State, 165 So. 2d 811 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
152. E.g., Beadles v. State, 162 So. 2d 4 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Williams v. State, 163
So. 2d 767 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
153. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.
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This amendment would retain the desirable feature of having the files and
records readily available to the court that considers the motion, while obviating the undesirable feature of having a trial judge sit in judgment on
his own alleged errors.
This new procedure would help to acc6mplish two of the recognized
objectives of Rule One; (1) to provide a remedy similar to that provided by
post-conviction habeas corpus; 54 and (2) to equitably distribute the Rule
One workload. 155 It would facilitate the first objective by assuring, as in postconviction habeas corpus procedure, that the judge who imposed a sentence
would usually not be required to consider a motion to vacate that sentence.
It is possible in Florida for the circuit judge who imposed a sentence to be
called upon to consider a habeas corpus petition seeking release from that
sentence. It seems unlikely that this happens very often, however, since the
prisoner is logically more inclined to fie his petition with some court other
than that which imposed sentence, for example, a district court of appeal or
the Florida Supreme Court. The proposed amendment would help accomplish the second objective by allowing all circuit court judges to handle a
substantial number of Rule One motions. Under the present procedure, many
circuit judges have very limited contact with the rule because they serve
in counties that have criminal courts of record; and, in those counties their
criminal jurisdiction is limited to capital cases. 158 The proposed amendment
would allow the circuit judges in those counties to share in the increased
workload created by Rule One.
The revision outlined above is substantially the same as that recommended
by Professor Clark. There are, however, two differences. Professor Clark
would retain the present procedure in misdemeanor cases. This distinction,
however, seems unwarranted. Circuit courts have appellate jurisdiction in
misdemeanor cases, but this should not cause any serious complications. This
appellate jurisdiction and the proposed jurisdiction in Rule One cases could
never overlap because Rule One cannot be used while any appellate remedy
is available.'157 Furthermore, the fact that a court has previously reviewed
a case on appeal does not disqualify that court from subsequently considering
a Rule One motion in the same case. The standards of review on appeal are
quite different from those employed in a collateral attack under Rule One.
Indeed, it might be advantageous to have the same court consider the appeal
and the Rule One motion, since this court could quickly dispose of the
motion if it raised grounds substantially similar to those argued on appeal.
In any event, it would seem that a prisoner in custody under a misdemeanor
conviction is entitled to the same degree of impartiality under Rule One that
is provided to the convicted felon.
The proposal above also differs from Professor Clark's recommendation
in one other particular. It would necessarily retain the present procedure
154. Gideon v. Wainwright, 153 So. 2d 299, 300 (Fla. 1963).
155. Id.
156. FLA. CoNsr. art. V, §§6 (3), 9(2).
157. Mitchell v. State, 167 So. 2d 27 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Austin v. State, 160 So. 2d
730 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
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in the event of a Rule One attack upon a sentence imposed by a circuit
court in a circuit having only one circuit judge. At present, this exception
would apply only to the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit. That circuit has a criminal court of record, so the circuit court has criminal jurisdiction only in capital cases. There seems to be no satisfactory alternative to this proviso. The circuit judge in this situation could not very well be required to assign the Rule
One motion to a judge of a court of lesser jurisdiction. This would amount to
an attempt to give an inferior court the power to vacate a sentence imposed
by a superior court. Similarly, the circuit judge could not properly be required to assign the motion to a circuit judge of another circuit. Aside from
the problem of not having the records readily available, this would be an
attempt to give a court of equal jurisdiction the power to vacate a sentence
imposed outside its jurisdiction. Thus, it appears that in this limited circumstance, now applicable to only one circuit judge who has criminal jurisdiction only in capital cases, the present system of having a judge review his
own sentences will have to be retained under the proposed amendment.
It is recognized that the recommended amendment will not eliminate all
possibility of prejudice under the rule. One of the most flagrant cases of
prejudice occurred when the judge hearing the Rule One motion was not
158
the same judge who originally sentenced the prisoner. In Dickens v. State,
the record disclosed that the prisoner had been sentenced to twenty years imprisonment in 1946. His Rule One motion alleged that he was seventeen years
old at the time of trial, that his parents were not notified of the trial, that
he had no attorney because he could not afford one, and that he pleaded
guilty only because the arresting officer told him to do so.
Filed with the motion was an affidavit of insolvency and a motion requesting appointment of counsel for the hearing. The trial judge set a
hearing on the motion, but did not order that the prisoner be produced
at the hearing and refused to appoint an attorney to represent him. At the
outset of the hearing, at which the assistant county solicitor was present, the
judge announced: "State of Florida versus Oliver Dickens, who stands charged
in three Informations, Numbers 29420, 29421, and 29422." The prisoner's
grandmother was the only witness present at the hearing. She was informed
by the judge that she could sit and listen to what the court did about the
matter. Then, before any testimony was heard, the judge began dictating
his order denying the Rule One motion. The grandmother was subsequently questioned by the judge concerning the prisoner's early commitment
to the industrial school for boys, his escapes from prison, and various
charges brought against him during these escapes, all of which was totally
irrelevant to the issue raised by the Rule One motion, that is, whether
Dickens was denied the right to counsel at his original trial. The hearing
concluded with a statement by the judge that the motion had been denied.
On appeal from this denial, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed,
holding that Dickens had obviously been denied his right to due process of
law.
158.

165 So. 2d 811 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
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The Dickens case is discussed in detail only to demonstrate what can
occur through judicial prejudice or a misunderstanding of Rule One. It
must be emphasized that cases of this type are in the extreme minority. A
reading of the approximately 450 appellate decisions to date dealing with
Rule One indicates a patient and judicious understanding of the rule by
most trial judges. It is submitted, however, that the possibility of partiality
can be further decreased by adoption of the amendment proposed above,
which deletes the requirement that a trial judge sit in judgment on his own
alleged errors. This requirement was not a great problem during the early
operation of the rule because most of the initial motions filed under it were
based on Gideon grounds. In those cases, the trial judge was not actually
being asked to review an "error" he had made. If the judge had refused
the appointment of counsel, he did so under controlling precedent from both
the United States and Florida Supreme Courts. During the five years following
Gideon, however, the cases involving the retroactive effect of that decision
have been substantially exhausted. Thus, most Rule One motions currently
being filed do allege real errors involving judicial judgment at the original
trial. It is simply not reasonable to require the judge who imposed sentence
despite these alleged errors to sit in judgment on the question whether the
errors were committed.
APPEAL FROM DENIAL OF A RULE ONE MOTION

Appeals from final orders under Rule One are controlled by the jurisdictional rules applicable to appeals generally. Thus, most appeals are taken to
the district court of appeal for the district in which the court entering the
order is located. The jurisdictional basis in the district court is established
solely by the order entered on the Rule One motion. The original judgment
of conviction being attacked in the Rule One proceeding is irrelevaht for
jurisdictional purposes. Therefore, an appeal from an order denying a Rule
One attack on a death sentence is not an appeal from a judgment "imposing
the death penalty" so as to vest jurisdiction in the Florida Supreme Court. 59
Under very limited circumstances, it may be possible to obtain review of the
district court's decision in the Florida Supreme Court by either appeal
or certiorari.1 60 An appeal may be taken directly to the Florida Supreme
Court only if the order denying the Rule One motion (1) directly passed
upon the validity of a state statute or a federal statute or treaty, or (2) construed a controlling provision of either the United States or Florida Constitution.1 6 '
Under the rule established by the Florida Supreme Court in State v.
Weeks, 1 62 and recently reaffirmed in State v. Herzig,163 an indigent prisoner
does not have an absolute, organic right to the assistance of appointed counsel
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Williams v. State, 178 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1965).
FLA. CONsr. art. V, §4 (2).
Id.
166 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1964).
208 So. 2d 619 (1968).
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on appeal from a Rule One denial. Each case must be decided in light of fifth
amendment due process requirements, the primary question being whether
counsel is required for a fair and complete presentation of the prisoner's
claims.
When appealing from the denial of a Rule One motion, the indigent
prisoner is entitled to a transcript of the proceedings relating to the Rule
One hearing.164 He is not entitled to a complete transcript of the original
trial record. He has a right only to those portions of the trial record that
relate directly to matters raised at the Rule One hearing. 165 This trial
record need not necessarily contain a verbatim transcript of the events
occurring at trial if a narrative summary is sufficient to show the basis of
the trial court's rulings.166 Of course, if the indigent does not file a notice of
appeal, or a Rule One motion, he is not entitled to any type of trial
1
transcript. 67
For several years following the promulgation of Rule One there was some
uncertainty whether sixty or ninety days should be allowed for taking an
appeal from an order denying relief under the rule. Several early decisions
indicated that the appeal time should be the same as that governing criminal
appeals, that is, ninety days, 68 while later decisions came to the conclusion
that the appeal time should be sixty days since Rule One was a collateral
attack in the nature of a civil proceeding.16 9 In Rolon v. State, 70 after tracing
the chronology of cases that made this transition and explaining their effect,
the Florida Supreme Court established the following rule: The time for taking
an appeal from an order denying relief under Rule One was ninety days if
the order was entered on or before June 29, 1965, and sixty days if the order
was entered after that date. This sixty-day time limit is tolled by the filing of
a notice of appeal with the trial judge, regardless of when the notice is
marked as having been filed in the clerk's office.17 1 The notice of appeal must
identify the order denying the Rule One motion, 172 and separate notices of
appeal are required to review separate orders denying Rule One relief to the
same prisoner.

7 3

The sixty days allowed for filing a notice of appeal is jurisdictional and
no court has the power to waive this requirement, even if the delay is caused
by state officers or employees.'7 4 If the notice of appeal is not timely filed, for
whatever reason, "the appellate court simply has no jurisdiction - no power to act"'1 75 and the appeal must be dismissed. If the prisoner can show that
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
597 (lst
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Grizzell v.State, 184 So. 2d 465 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
Hall v. State, 165 So. 2d 428 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
Lee v. State, 165 So. 2d 443 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
Cowan v. State, 202 So. 2d 831 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
E.g., Roy v. Wainwright, 151 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1963).
E.g., Lawrence v. State, 198 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1967); Barton v. State, 176 So. 2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
201 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1967).
Hodd v. State, 163 So. 2d 893 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
Nelson v. State, 181 So. 2d 192 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
Carroll v. State, 171 So. 2d 197 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
Burke v. State, 160 So. 2d 523 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
State ex rel. Ervin v. Smith, 160 So. 2d 518, 520 (Fla. 1964).
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the delay was the result of some type of state action, or inaction, the dismissal
should be without prejudice to the prisoner's right to seek review of his
Rule One denial by way of habeas corpus. 76 All too often, untimely appeals
are caused by a court clerk's failure to notify the prisoner of his Rule One
denial within a reasonable time. The prisoner's appeal time may have
expired before he is even notified of the order denying his Rule One motion.
When this happens, it is clear that habeas corpus can be used in lieu of an
appeal since the orderly appellate remedy has been rendered unavailable to
1
state action
8
recently decided by the United States
Under Anders v. California,"7
Supreme Court, an appointed attorney cannot withdraw from an appeal on
the ground that the appeal is frivolous unless he first files a brief with the
appellate court referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. The Anders decision was recently applied by the Florida
Supreme Court.1 7 9 Anders actually dealt with a direct appeal, but its rationale may be applied to appeals from Rule One denials and other collateral
attacks. Already it is established that a trial judge cannot refuse to adjudicate
a prisoner's insolvency on the ground that an appeal from a Rule One denial would be frivolous.1 80
Appeals from orders denying Rule One relief are governed by the same
general principles applicable to other types of appeals. Thus, the evidence
in the record on appeal must be "viewed in a light most favorable to the
trial court's ruling."1 And, of course, the prisoner cannot raise any matters
on appeal that were not raised in the Rule One motion. 8 2 An appeal may be
quashed as frivolous if the same question presented by the appeal has been
previously decided contrary to the prisoner's position. 1 3 The prisoner has
no absolute right to have his appointed attorney heard orally by the appellate
court, if that court determines that oral argument would serve no useful
84
purpose.
Following the promulgation of Rule One, the district courts of appeal
adopted rules to eliminate costs for movants appealing from Rule One
denials. 8 5 These rules eliminate fees and costs "in like manner and to the
same extent as in habeas corpus proceedings or appeals therefrom, arising
out of, or in connection with criminal causes or convictions," as provided
by Rule 2.2 (b) (6) of the Florida Appellate Rules. 88 The rules provide that
176.
177.
178.
184 So.

Burke v. State, 160 So. 2d 523 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
Cappetta v. Wainwright, 203 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1967).
386 U.S. 738 (1967). But see dissenting opinion by Thornal, C.J.; Price v. State,
2d 681 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1966). Contra, Baker v. Wainwright, 197 So. 2d 290 (Fla.

1967).
179. State v. Herzig, 208 So. 2d 619, 623 (1968).
180. Foxworth v. Wainwright, 167 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1964).
181. Plymale v. State, 201 So. 2d 85, 86 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
182. McKenzie v. State, 202 So. 2d 578 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
183. Jeffers v. State, 174 So. 2d 552 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
184. Gillen v. State, 172 So. 2d 1 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
185. In re Internal Gov't of the Dist. Court of Appeal, 156 So. 2d 896 (1st D.C.A. Fla.
1963); 156 So. 2d 655 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963); 156 So. 2d 415 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
186. Id.
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no trial court clerk shall require the payment of fees or costs upon the filing
of a notice of appeal, regardless of the movant's insolvency.' 8 ' The movant,
however, is not entitled to bail pending appeal of a Rule One denial. 188
CUSTODY REQUIREMENTS UNDER RULE ONE

Rule One can be used by any "prisoner in custody under Sentence of a
89
court established by the Laws of Florida claiming the right to be released."'1
This language has placed serious limitations on the operation of the rule,
limitations which probably were not intended by the drafters of the rule and
which certainly are not consistent with the general purpose of the rule, that
is, to provide a broadly based post-conviction remedy.
The early decisions from the district courts of appeal consistently held
that a prisoner must, in fact, be presently "in custody" under a particular
sentence in order to use Rule One to attack that sentence. 90 In Jones v.
State,191 however, the second district reversed two of its previous decisions
and held that a prisoner could attack a consecutive sentence even though he
did not attack the sentence he was presently serving. The court reasoned
that the prisoner was actually "in custody" under both sentences even
though he was serving only one because, if the sentence being served were
vacated for any reason, the consecutive sentence would prevent the prisoner's
release from custody. The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction of
the Jones decision by conflict certiorari. While the case was pending, the
first sentence expired and Jones began serving the sentence that was the
subject of his Rule One attack. Thus, the issue presented by Jones became
92
moot and could not be decided.1
The Jones case was impliedly overruled, however, by the Florida Supreme
Court in Johnson v. State,' 93 a case that allowed a prisoner to attack not only
the sentence he was serving, but ten consecutive sentences as well although
he was not literally "in custody" under any of these consecutive sentences.
The court reasoned that it would be ludicrous to require the prisoner to
attack his eleven sentences one at a time, and held that he could attack them
simultaneously, since they were imposed by the same court, and since the
prisoner would be entitled to release if successful. Under Johnson, a prisoner
can use Rule One to attack a sentence he is not presently serving if: (1) that
sentence was imposed by the same court which imposed the sentence he is
serving, and (2) he will be entitled to immediate release if successful. Implicit
in this rule is the requirement that the prisoner must also attack the sentence
he is serving.
187. Id.
188. Simmons v. State, 163 So. 2d 888 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
189. See Appendix I (emphasis added).
190. E.g., Paul v. State, 165 So. 2d 779 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964). See also Pritchett v. State,
193 So. 2d 185 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
191. 174 So. 2d 453 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965); Dovico v. State, 178 So. 2d 340 (2d D.C.A.
Fla. 1965).
192. State v. Jones, 181 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1966).
193. 184 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1966), aff'd on rehearing,185 So. 2d 466 (1966).
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It must be recognized that the requirement of release in Johnson has
reference only to cases in which the prisoner is attempting to attack a sentence
in addition to the one being served. Although at least one district court
of appeal case decided since Johnson has held to the contrary,19 4 it is respectfully submitted that there is nothing in Rule One or the Johnson decision, other than dictum, to prevent a prisoner from attacking the sentence
he is serving simply because he would not be entitled to release due to some
other concurrent or consecutive sentence pending against him.295 The Johnson
case began by reciting the fact that the trial judge had granted the Rule One
motion "as to the first of the consecutive sentences which was the one then
being served, but denied it as to the remaining sentences on the ground that
they could not be attacked under a Rule One motion because they were not
then being served."' 98 The court then stated that the issue to be determined
was "whether our Rule of Criminal Procedure No. 1 authorizes a motion attacking a series of consecutive sentences when no other presumptively valid
sentence against the same individual is outstanding."1 97 That the supreme
court in Johnson was concerned only with the consecutive sentences is also
shown by its opinion on rehearing, which stated that the first opinion "dealt
only with petitioner's right to seek relief from ten of the eleven judgments
and sentences laid upon him .... ,198 The trial court had held that Johnson
could attack his first sentence, which he was serving, even though he would
not be entitled to be released because of the other consecutive sentences. The
court simply accepted this holding as correct and moved on to the question
whether the petitioner could attack the ten consecutive sentences in addition
to the one he was serving.
If the rule stated in Johnson is applied to sentences presently being
served, several unwarranted and unintended results will necessarily follow.
For example, a prisoner in custody serving two allegedly void concurrent
sentences would not be able to use Rule One to attack either sentence if they
were imposed by different courts. He could not attack the sentence he was
actually serving because he would not be entitled to be released if successful,
and he would be unable to attack the sentences simultaneously, as allowed in
Johnson, because they were imposed by different courts. For the same
reasons, a prisoner could not attack the allegedly invalid sentence he
was serving, or an allegedly invalid consecutive sentence, if they were
imposed by different courts. If a prisoner were serving a series of consecutive sentences imposed by different courts, he would have to serve all
except the last, and only then would he be allowed to attack that sentence.
As stated by Justice Thornal in State v. Weeks, 99 a proceeding under Rule
One is "analogous to post-conviction habeas corpus." This analogy lends
194. McDowell v. State, 195 So. 2d 586 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
195. E.g., Falagon v. State, 167 So. 2d 62 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
196. Johnson v. State, 184 So. 2d 161, 163 (Fla. 1966) (emphasis added).
197. Id. (emphasis added).
198. Johnson v. State, 185 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1966) (emphasis added).
199. State v. Weeks, 166 So. 2d 892, 897 (Fla. 1964). See also Gideon v. Wainwright,
153 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1963), in which Justice Thornal stated that Rule One was "coextensive" with habeas corpus.
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additional support to the proposition that the Johnson rule does not apply
to sentences being served because there is no requirement that a prisoner
seeking habeas corpus relief be entitled to release if successful.200 In fact,
habeas corpus can be used even though the petitioner would not be entitled
to be released from the sentence being served. This has been allowed in
cases in which the prisoner alleges that his sentence has not been computed
correctly, and habeas corpus is used to reduce, rather than vacate, the sentence. 20 1 It seems likely that this same type of relief could be allowed under
Rule One. One of the specific grounds for relief under the rule is that the
sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law. This ground
seems inconsistent with the "release" language in the rule since a person
claiming his sentence was in excess of the maximum would not actually
be claiming the right to be released from the sentence. Instead, he would
simply be seeking to have the sentence reduced. When this problem arises,
the more reasonable approach would be to hold that a prisoner can use the
rule to have his sentence reduced if it is in excess of the maximum allowed
by law.
The Johnson decision represents the outer limits in relieving the restrictive requirements of the "in custody" language. To allow any broader
coverage under the rule would be tantamount to interpreting away this
language. Even after Johnson, however, there are still many situations that
should be covered by the rule, but which are not covered because of the
"in custody" requirement. Moreover, there are other situations in which
opposite results may be reached due to the purely fortuitous circumstances in
which the court imposed a particular sentence.
This latter situation is demonstrated by Holstein v. State,20 2 a decision
recently handed down by the First District Court of Appeal. In 1962, at age
fifteen, Holstein received an indefinite sentence of six months to five years
in Jackson County for larceny of an automobile. He was paroled from
this sentence in 1965, but while on parole, he received an eight-year sentence
from the Dade County Criminal Court of Record for possession of burglary
tools. Holstein's parole was then revoked and the Jackson County sentence
was reinstated to begin at the expiration of the Dade County sentence. While
serving this Dade County sentence, Holstein filed a Rule One motion attacking
the Jackson County sentence, contending that it was preventing his eligibility
for parole. The trial court denied the motion and the first district affirmed.
The district court recognized the Johnson requirement that a movant "must
attack the sentence which he is presently serving," 20 but did not base its
decision on this ground. Instead, the court grounded its affirmance primarily
on the fact that the consecutive sentence being attacked was imposed by a

200. Dora v. Cochran, 138 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1962) (the only requirement is that the
prisoner be in custody under the sentence he is attacking); Fretwell v. Wainwright, 185 So.
2d 701 (Fla. 1966).
201. E.g., Falagan v. Wainwright, 195 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1967).
202. 205 So. 2d 6 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
203. Id. at 7.
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different court from that which imposed the sentence he was serving. The
204
first district stated:
Holstein's complaint here is that since he was so unfortunate as to be
convicted and sentenced in more than one court, he is being denied
the advantage of presently attacking his sentence which will begin in
the future. This is a procedural matter. The only body having authority to change this procedure is our State Supreme Court ....
Under this reasoning, a movant would be prevented from attacking a consecutive sentence even though he simultaneously attacked the sentence he was
serving, if the consecutive sentence was imposed by a different court. Thus,
the result would be contrary to that obtained in Johnson, although the only
distinction would be in the court imposing the consecutive sentence. This
dichotomy may be required by Johnson, but it has no basis in logic or reason
and was probably not anticipated at the time Rule One was initially drafted.
The Johnson decision was concerned only with the circumstances under
which a prisoner can attack sentences scheduled to begin in the future. But
in a later case also involving a prisoner named Johnson, Johnson v. State,20 s
the Second District Court of Appeal extended the supreme court's Johnson
decision to apply to a sentence that had been completely served. In the
district court's Johnson decision, the defendant was convicted on a guilty
plea in circuit court of being a convicted felon in possession of firearms
in violation of section 790.23 of the Florida Statutes. The basis for this
conviction was a 1948 felony conviction imposed by the same circuit court, the
sentence for which had been served. The defendant moved to vacate the
1948 conviction under Rule One, which would also require the setting aside
of the conviction under section 790.23. The trial judge denied this motion,
but the second district reversed, holding the defendant could attack the
1948 conviction "as though it were a successive sentence since he is presently
in custody." 20 6 The district court reasoned that such a result was required
under the supreme court's Johnson decision, since the 1948 conviction was
imposed by the same court and the movant was seeking to be released from

204. Id. at 8.
205. 203 So. 2d 36 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967). A somewhat related situation was presented
in McCormick v. State, 164 So. 2d 557 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964). There the prisoner was
serving a life sentence imposed under §775.10 of the Florida Statutes, which provides for
a life sentence for any person convicted of a fourth felony. He filed a Rule One motion
claiming to have been illegally punished under this section because he was denied the
right to counsel at all three of the previous felony trials, which served as a basis for his
life imprisonment. The trial judge summarily denied this motion, and the Third District
Court of Appeal affirmed, holding the three prior convictions could not be attacked because the prisoner was not in custody under any of these convictions. The McCormick case
was decided prior to the two Johnson decisions discussed above, but it seems unlikely that
the result would be any different today, even if the three prior convictions had occurred
in the same court. This follows because the prisoner would still not be entitled to be
released if successful, he would still be subject to custody for the fourth felony.
206. Id. at 38.
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custody. Presumably a different result would have been required if the
20 °
1948 conviction had been imposed by a different court.

It is apparent from the above discussion that the "in custody" requirement has created many uncertainties and technical distinctions in the operation of the Rule One. Many of these distinctions seem to have little basis in
policy or reason. It is recommended, therefore, that the custody requirement
be removed from the rule. This could be accomplished by deleting the
208
following language:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by the
laws of Florida claiming the right to be released upon the ground
that ....
and substituting the following therefor:
Any person who has received, and is suffering or will suffer a serious
deprivation because of, a sentence imposed by a court established under
the Laws of Florida, who claims that ....
This amendment would allow relief in cases similar to those discussed above,
without any distinctions based on such fortuitous factors as which court imposed a particular sentence. This revision would also allow relief in several
other situations in which relief is now denied. 20 9 For example, a different
result would have to be reached in such cases as Pritchett v. State,210 which
held that a prisoner would have to complete his present twenty-year sentence
before attacking a consecutive twenty-year sentence. This decision was undoubtedly correct under the present rule,211 but the better post-conviction procedure would seem to be to allow prisoners to attack their consecutive sentences at the earliest possible time. If the prisoner is required to wait until
he is literally "in custody" under the consecutive sentence, he may have great
difficulty in presenting his claims. Many witnesses might be dead or missing
and much of the evidence might be misplaced. Conversely, if the prisoner
is successful in having his sentence vacated, the state might have trouble in
convicting him on retrial for the same reasons. If a sentence is subject to
collateral attack, there is no valid reason for delaying a decision on the merits
of this attack. Such delays do not aid the administration of criminal justice;
they simply postpone until tomorrow decisions which could be more fairly
made today.

207. See generally Echols v. State, 201 So. 2d 89 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967); State v. Dixon,
193 So. 2d 62 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
208. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.
209. Under this amendment, a prisoner could probably attack a concurrent sentence,
which is not presently allowed. Yates v. State, 199 So. 2d 340 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1967). Also,
a parolee or probationer might be able to attack sentences pending against him.
210.

193 So. 2d 185 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1966).

211. See Pritchett v. State, 198 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1967), in which the Florida Supreme
Court denied Pritchett's petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the authority of Johnson
v. State, 184 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1966).
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RELATION OF RULE ONE TO POST-CONVICTION HABEAS CoRPus

Rule One has seriously limited the use of post-conviction habeas corpus in
212
Florida. The rule provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who
is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this rule, shall
not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply
for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such
court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by
motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
Thus, the petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus must show that Rule
One is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention, or that
he has exhausted his remedies under the rule,'2 13 including appellate remedies.214 Habeas corpus cannot be used as a substitute for timely appeal from
a Rule One denial.

/

215

In certain exceptional circumstances, however, the petitioner may be able
to employ the writ in lieu of an appeal by showing that his failure to appeal
was due to some prejudicial action, or inaction, by an agent of the state. 21 6
If Rule One remedies have not been exhausted, the habeas corpus petition
should be denied without prejudice to file a Rule One motion. In some
cases, the petition for habeas corpus will be denied without prejudice to
proceed again under the rule even though all Rule One remedies have been
exhausted; this may be done in cases in which the habeas corpus petition
alleges adequate grounds for relief and the court believes they can be de21
termined more efficiently under the rule. In other cases, however, the court may issue a writ of habeas corpus notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner has not exhausted his Rule One
remedies. This can be done, for example, in cases in which there is some
fundamental error appearing on the face of the record, such as a sentence
greater than the maximum allowed for the crime of which the petitioner
has been convicted.

21 8

CURRENT STATUS OF

Coram Nobis

The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure were revised in 1962 to provide that:
"[w]rits of error coram nobis . . . are abolished."21 9 This revision created
some doubt as to the continued efficacy of coram nobis as a post-conviction
212. Appendix I.
213. Mitchell v. Wainwright, 155 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1963).
214. Brown v. Wainwright, 158 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 1963); Gafford v. Wainwright, 157 So.
2d 138 (Fla. 1963).
215. Evans v. State, 175 So. 2d 226 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
216. Cappetta v. Wainwright, 203 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1967); cf. Hollingshead v. Wainwright, 194 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1967).
217. Evans v. State, 168 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1964).
218. Dallas v.Wainwright, 175 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1965).
219. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.38.
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remedy for attacking criminal judgments. 220 The prevailing opinion seems
to be, however, that the writ can still be used when Rule One and habeas
corpus are unavailable. 221 It is clear that the writ cannot be used whenever
Rule One is adequate and effective. 222 The Third District Court of Appeal
has indicated that the writ can be used to attack a sentence when the movant
is not "in custody" under that sentence and would therefore be unable to
use Rule One or habeas corpus. 223 The First District Court of Appeal has
to attack a criminal judgimpliedly held that coram nobis can still be used
224
evidence.
discovered
newly
of
basis
the
ment on
While habeas corpus is substantially similar to Rule One, there are numerous differences between the rule and coram nobis. For example, application
for the writ of error coram nobis must be made with the time allowed for
2 25
appeal, unless good cause is shown for the delay, but a Rule One motion
may be filed at any time. If the judgment has been affirmed on appeal, leave
must be obtained from the appellate court before applying for the writ in
the trial court. 226 If the writ is issued, a jury trial is held to resolve any
factual issues.227 The primary purpose of the writ is to direct the attention of
the court to specific facts not known to the petitioner at trial, but which are
of such a vital nature that they would have prevented the rendition of the
has
judgment had they been revealed. 228 If the writ is denied, the defendant
229 The state, however, has no right of appeal.22 0
the right of appeal.
CREDIT UPON RESENTENCING

Practically all movants who are successful in having their sentences vacated
231
Therefore,
under Rule One, or any other proceeding, are subject to retrial.
a tangential issue in any discussion of post-conviction remedies involves the
determination of what credit, if any, should be allowed upon resentencing for
time served under the vacated sentence. The prisoner is clearly entitled to

220. See, e.g., Grant v. State, 166 So. 2d 503 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Pynes v. State, 66
So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1953); cf. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954).
221. Cf. Kinsey v. State, 19 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1944); Lee v. State, 173 So. 2d 520 (lst
D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
222. Falagon v. State, 167 So. 2d 62 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
223. See McCormick v. State, 164 So. 2d 557 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
224. Sanders v. State, 190 So. 2d 399 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1966); Wolfe v. State, 190 So. 2d
397 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
225. Guarino v. State, 69 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1953).
226. Russ v. State, 95 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1957); Ex parte TWelles, 53 So. 2d 708 (Fla.

1951).
227. Chambers v. State, 117 Fla. 642, 158 So. 153 (1934); Homer v. State, 158 So. 2d
789 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
228. Lamb v. State, 91 Fla. 396, 107 So. 585 (1926).
229. Reed v. State, 94 Fla. 32, 113 So. 630 (1927).
230. Washington v. State, 92 Fla. 740, 110 So. 259 (Fla. 1926); Lamb v. State, 91 Fla.
896, 107 So. 535 (1926).
281. One exception to this relates to those cases in which the sentence is set aside
on grounds of double jeopardy. Cf. Ray v. State, 200 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1967) .
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credit for time served on the void sentence, 232 and the trial judge is presumed
to have given credit for time served on the void sentence when he imposes
a new sentence on retrial. 23 3 Under this presumption, it is possible for the
sentence on retrial to be greater than the one which was set aside. The
appellate courts will allow such sentences to stand, provided that the new
sentence plus the time served on the vacated sentence, including gain time,
does not exceed the maximum allowable for the particular crime involved. 234
The new sentence will be interpreted according to the plain meaning of the
language used; the appellate court will not try to second guess the trial judge
235
as to what credit was intended.
A prisoner cannot receive credit on a valid sentence for time previously
served on a void sentence. 236 But when a valid sentence is consecutive to a
void sentence, the valid sentence will be deemed to have begun when it was
237
imposed rather than at the expiration or vacation of the void sentence.
In this manner, the prisoner can receive "credit" for time served on a void
sentence.
CONCLUSION

The Gideon decision presented a severe test for Florida's collateral postconviction remedies. As a result of that decision the state was faced with the
herculean task of trying to consider and determine the post-conviction claims
of almost 5,000 prisoners who suddenly became eligible to file motions to
vacate their sentences. In order to handle the anticipated deluge of motions,
the Florida Supreme Court promulgated Criminal Procedure Rule One.
After five years of operation it is dear that the rule has fulfilled its primary
purpose of providing an efficient forum for prompt and fair consideration of
belatedy recognized constitutional rights.
This is not to say, however, that Rule One cannot be improved. This
article recommends three specific amendments: (1) adoption of a form to
be used in the filing of all Rule One motions; (2) abolishment of the requirement that the motion to vacate a sentence be heard by the judge who imposed the sentence; and (3) deletion of the requirement that a person be
"in custody" under a sentence before attacking that particular sentence.
Through the adoption of these amendments, the Florida Supreme Court can
substantially improve the operation of Rule One.

232. Tilghman v. Mayo, 82 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 1955); Perry v. Mayo, 72 So. 2d 382 (Fla.

1954).
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Little v. Wainwright, 161 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 1964).
Id.; Lassiter v. State, 166 So. 2d 159 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
Falagan v. Wainwright, 195 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1967).
Montford v. Wainwright, 162 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1964).
Sterns v. Wainwright, 195 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1967); Helton v. Mayo, 15 So. 2d 416

(Fla. 1943).
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RULE 1.850, FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Motion To Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence; Hearing;Appeal
"A prisoner in custody under Sentence of a court established by the Laws of Florida
claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation
of the Constitution or Laws of the United States, or of the State of Florida, or that the
court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess
of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move
the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
"A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
"Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the
prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the
prosecuting attorney of the court, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues
and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. If the court finds
that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not
authorized by law or is otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a
denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment
vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and
shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence
as may appear appropriate.
"A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the production
of the prisoner at the hearing.
"The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion
for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.
"An appeal may be taken to the appropriate appellate court from the order entered on
the motion as from a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas corpus.
"An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized
to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this rule, shall not be entertained if it appears
that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced
him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by
motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention."
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APPENDIX II
Motion To Vacate Sentence, Filed Pursuant to Rule 1.850, Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure

(Sentencing Court)
Full name and prison number of Petitioner
vs.
Case No.
(to be supplied by Clerk of
sentencing court)
Name of Respondent
Instructions - Read Carefully
In order for this motion to receive consideration by the sentencing court, it must be
typewritten or legibly handwritten, must be signed and verified by the Petitioner, and must
set forth in concise form the answers to each applicable question. If necessary, Petitioner
may finish answering a particular question on the reverse side of the page or an additional
blank page.
Because every motion under Rule 1.850 must be sworn to under oath before relief can
be granted, any misrepresentation of a material fact in this motion may serve as the basis of
prosecution and conviction for perjury. Therefore, the Petitioner should exercise great
care to assure that all answers are true. When this form is c&mpleted, the original and
one copy shall be mailed to the clerk of the court which imposed the sentence being
attacked.
1. Place of detention
2. Name and location of court which, and name of judge who, imposed
sentence
3. Indictment or information number or numbers (if known) upon which and the
offense or offenses for which sentence was imposed:

(a)
(b)
(C)
4. The date upon which sentence was imposed and the terms of the sentence:
(a)
(b)

(c)
5.

6.
made

7.
8.

Check whether a finding of guilty was made
(a) after a plea of guilty
(b) after a plea of not guilty
(c) after a plea of nolo contendere
If you were found guilty after a plea of not guilty, check whether that finding was
by
(a) a jury
(b) a judge without a jury
Did you appeal from the judgment of conviction or the imposition of sentence? -If you answered "yes" to (7), list
(a) the name of each court to which you appealed:
i.
ii.
iii.
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(b)

the result in each such court to which you appealed:
i.
ii.
iii.

(c) the date of each such result:
i.

9. State concisely the grounds on which you base your allegation that the sentence
which was imposed on you is invalid:
(a)
-_-(b)
(C
) ..-.--------.-.
-.-..-.--.-.-..-. --.-......
..... . . .. ....
.
. . . .
10. State concisely and in the same order the acts which support each of the grounds
set out in (9):
(a)
(b)
(c)
11. Have you previously filed petitions for habeas corpus, motions to vacate sentence
under Rule 1.850, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, or any other applications, petitions
or motions with respect to this conviction?
12. If you answer "yes" to (11), list with respect to each petition, motion or application
(a) the specific nature thereof:
i.

(b)

the name and location of the court in which each was filed:

(c)

the disposition thereof:
i.

(d)

the date of each such disposition:

(e) if known, citations of any written opinions or orders entered pursuant to each
such disposition:

13. Has any ground set forth in (9) been previously presented to this or any other court
by way of petition for habeas corpus, motion to vacate sentence under Rule 1.850, Florida
Rules of Criminal Procedure, or any other petition, motion or application?
14. If you answer "yes" to (13), identify
(a) which grounds have been previously presented:

(b)

the proceedings in which each ground was raised:

1.

1i.

-------

_____________
-
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15. Were you represented by an attorney at any time during the course of:
(a) your arraignment and plea?
(b) your trial, if any?
(c) your sentencing?
(d) your appeal, if any, from the judgment of conviction or the imposition
of sentence?
(e) preparation, presentation or consideration of any petitions, motions or applications with respect to this conviction, which you filed?
16. If you answered "yes" to one or more parts of (15), list
(a) the name and address of each attorney who represented you:
i.
ii.
iii.

(b) the proceedings at which each such attorney represented you:
1i.
Ui.

Signature of Petitioner
)ss

)

being first sworn under oath, presents that he has subscribed to the foregoing petition and does state that the information therein is true and
correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this
of
month
year

-

Signature of Afliant
day

Notary Public
My commission expires
(month, day, year)
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